梁晶工作室新书《公司金融理论》（影印版）英文目录

　　Contents

　　Acknowledgements

　　Introduction

　　Overview of the Field and Coverage of the Book

　　Approach

　　Prerequisites and Further Reading

　　Some Important Omissions

　　References

　　I An Economic Overview of Corporate Institutions

　　1 Corporate Governance

　　1.1 Introduction: The Separation of Ownership and Control

　　1.2 Managerial Incentives: An Overview

　　1.3 The Board of Directors

　　1.4 Investor Activism

　　1.5 Takeovers and Leveraged Buyouts

　　1.6 Debt as a Governance Mechanism

　　1.7 International Comparisons of the Policy Environment

　　1.8 Shareholder Value or Stakeholder Society?

　　Supplementary Section

　　1.9 The Stakeholder Society: Incentives and Control Issues

　　Appendixes

　　1.10 Cadbury Report

　　1.11 Notes to Tables

　　References

　　2 Corporate Financing:Some Stylized Facts

　　2.1 Introduction

　　2.2 Modigliani?Miller and the Financial Structure Puzzle

　　2.3 Debt Instruments

　　2.4 Equity Instruments

　　2.5 Financing Patterns

　　2.6 Conclusion

　　Appendixes

　　2.7 The Five Cs of Credit Analysis

　　2.8 Loan Covenants

　　References

　　II Corporate Financing and Agency Costs

　　3 Outside Financing Capacity

　　3.1 Introduction

　　3.2 The Role of Net Worth: A Simple Model of Credit Rationing

　　3.3 Debt Overhang

　　3.4 Borrowing Capacity: The Equity Multiplier

　　Supplementary Sections

　　3.5 Related Models of Credit Rationing:Inside Equity and Outside Debt

　　3.6 Verifiable Income

　　3.7 Semiverifiable Income

　　3.8 Nonverifiable Income

　　3.9 Exercises

　　References

　　4 Some Determinants of Borrowing Capacity

　　4.1 Introduction: The Quest for Pledgeable Income

　　4.2 Boosting the Ability to Borrow:Diversification and Its Limits

　　4.3 Boosting the Ability to Borrow:The Costs and Benefits of Collateralization

　　4.4 The Liquidity?Accountability Tradeoff

　　4.5 Restraining the Ability to Borrow:Inalienability of Human Capital

　　Supplementary Sections

　　4.6 Group Lending and Microfinance

　　4.7 Sequential Projects

　　4.8 Exercises

　　References

　　5 Liquidity and Risk Management, Free Cash Flow, and Long-Term Finance

　　5.1 Introduction

　　5.2 The Maturity of Liabilities

　　5.3 The Liquidity?Scale Tradeoff

　　5.4 Corporate Risk Management

　　5.5 Endogenous Liquidity Needs, the Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow,and the Soft Budget Constraint

　　5.6 Free Cash Flow

　　5.7 Exercises

　　References

　　6 Corporate Financing under Asymmetric Information

　　6.1 Introduction

　　6.2 Implications of the Lemons Problem and of Market Breakdown

　　6.3 Dissipative Signals

　　Supplementary Section

　　6.4 Contract Design by an Informed Party:An Introduction

　　Appendixes

　　6.5 Optimal Contracting in the Privately-Known-Prospects Model

　　6.6 The Debt Bias with a Continuum of Possible Incomes

　　6.7 Signaling through Costly Collateral

　　6.8 Short Maturities as a Signaling Device

　　6.9 Formal Analysis of the Underpricing Problem

　　6.10 Exercises

　　References

　　7 Topics: Product Markets and Earnings Manipulations

　　7.1 Corporate Finance and Product Markets

　　7.2 Creative Accounting and Other Earnings Manipulations

　　Supplementary Section

　　7.3 Brander and Lewis’s Cournot Analysis

　　7.4 Exercises

　　References

　　III Exit and Voice: Passive and Active Monitoring

　　8 Investors of Passage: Entry, Exit, and Speculation

　　8.1 General Introduction to Monitoring in Corporate Finance

　　8.2 Performance Measurement and the Value of Speculative Information

　　8.3 Market Monitoring

　　8.4 Monitoring on the Debt Side:Liquidity-Draining versus Liquidity-Neutral Runs

　　8.5 Exercises

　　References

　　9 Lending Relationships and Investor Activism

　　9.1 Introduction

　　9.2 Basics of Investor Activism

　　9.3 The Emergence of Share Concentration

　　9.4 Learning by Lending

　　9.5 Liquidity Needs of Large Investors and Short-Termism

　　9.6 Exercises

　　References

　　IV Security Design:The Control Right View

　　10 Control Rights and Corporate Governance

　　10.1 Introduction

　　10.2 Pledgeable Income and the Allocation of Control Rights between Insiders and Outsiders

　　10.3 Corporate Governance and Real Control

　　10.4 Allocation of Control Rights among Securityholders

　　Supplementary Sections

　　10.5 Internal Capital Markets

　　10.6 Active Monitoring and Initiative

　　10.7 Exercises

　　References

　　11 Takeovers

　　11.1 Introduction

　　11.2 The Pure Theory of Takeovers:A Framework

　　11.3 Extracting the Raider’s Surplus:Takeover Defenses as Monopoly Pricing

　　11.4 Takeovers and Managerial Incentives

　　11.5 Positive Theory of Takeovers:Single-Bidder Case

　　11.6 Value-Decreasing Raider and the One-Share?One-Vote Result

　　11.7 Positive Theory of Takeovers:Multiple Bidders

　　11.8 Managerial Resistance

　　11.9 Exercise

　　References

　　V Security Design:The Demand Side View

　　12 Consumer Liquidity Demand

　　12.1 Introduction

　　12.2 Consumer Liquidity Demand:The Diamond?Dybvig Model and the Term Structure of Interest Rates

　　12.3 Runs

　　12.4 Heterogenous Consumer Horizons and the Diversity of Securities

　　Supplementary Sections

　　12.5 Aggregate Uncertainty and Risk Sharing

　　12.6 Private Signals and Uniqueness in Bank Run Models

　　12.7 Exercises

　　References

　　VI Macroeconomic Implications and the Political Economy of Corporate Finance

　　13 Credit Rationing and Economic Activity

　　13.1 Introduction

　　13.2 Capital Squeezes and Economic Activity:The Balance-Sheet Channel

　　13.3 Loanable Funds and the Credit Crunch:The Lending Channel

　　13.4 Dynamic Complementarities:Net Worth Effects, Poverty Traps,and the Financial Accelerator

　　13.5 Dynamic Substitutabilities:The Deflationary Impact of Past Investment

　　13.6 Exercises

　　References

　　14 Mergers and Acquisitions, and the Equilibrium Determination of Asset Values

　　14.1 Introduction

　　14.2 Valuing Specialized Assets

　　14.3 General Equilibrium Determination of Asset Values, Borrowing Capacities,and Economic Activity:The Kiyotaki?Moore Model

　　14.4 Exercises

　　References

　　15 Aggregate Liquidity Shortages and Liquidity Asset Pricing

　　15.1 Introduction

　　15.2 Moving Wealth across States of Nature:When Is Inside Liquidity Sufficient?

　　15.3 Aggregate Liquidity Shortages and Liquidity Asset Pricing

　　15.4 Moving Wealth across Time:The Case of the Corporate Sector as a Net Lender

　　15.5 Exercises

　　References

　　16 Institutions, Public Policy, and the Political Economy of Finance

　　16.1 Introduction

　　16.2 Contracting Institutions

　　16.3 Property Rights Institutions

　　16.4 Political Alliances

　　Supplementary Sections

　　16.5 Contracting Institutions,Financial Structure, and Attitudes toward Reform

　　16.6 Property Rights Institutions:Are Privately Optimal Maturity Structures Socially Optimal?

　　16.7 Exercises

　　References

　　VII Answers to Selected Exercises, and Review Problems

　　Answers to Selected Exercises

　　Review Problems

　　Answers to Selected Review Problems

　　Index